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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Tlfl<: OIL SHALE CORPORATION,
a :; enula Corporation,
Pl ai11ti ff-A Ji pell ant,
-I'S,-

I·'RED Y. LARSON, also known as
F'JrnDr~RICK v. LARSON,
~JTHEL B. LARSON, Husband and
Wife; FREDERICK H. LARSON
all(! DOROTHY H. LARSON,
ff us band aml Wife.
Def e ndants-Rcs zwnd ent s.

\

Case
No.10887

PETITION FOR REHEARING
'l'he plaintiff-appellant respectfully petitions this
1Io11orahl0 Court for rc>hearing in the above entitled case
npon thL· following grounds:
I. 'l'HI8 COURT'S DECISION OF MARCH
6, 1%8 IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE:

.1. Tl1is Court has based its decision on Find-

iJ1,r;s of Fact aml Conclusions of Law which
had !Jec11 i-acatcd by the trial court and
1lirl so at defendant's 11rgin9.
1

B. Defendants are precluded from contestinq
the trial court's finding that there was a
binding option contract because (1) de.
fendants urged the trial court to rnah
such a finding and (2) defendants liat·c
not filed a cross-appeal asserting such
finding as error.
C. The trial court found, and wa.s correct
finding, a binding option contract.

II.

i11

THIS COURT HAS NOT DECIDED THE
SOLE QUESTION ON APPEAL WHICH
IS WHETHER AN UNAMBIGUOUS OPTION CONTRACT CAN BE VARIED BY
P AROL EVIDENCE.
VAN COTT BAGLEY, CORNWALl
& McCARTHY
CLIFFORD
How ARD
DoN

\V.

L. AsHTON
L. EDw ARDS
CROCKETT

Attorneys for Appellant
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
I. THIS COURT'S DECISION OF MARCH

6, 1968 IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE:

A. This Court has based its decision on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which
had been racated by the trial court and
did so at defendant's urging.
'l'liis cas0 is an appeal from a judgment of the trial
c1mrt "·hich found that defendants, in consideration of
the paym011t of $20,000 by plaintiff, had granted plaintiff au option of six months' duration to lease certain
rni11i11g claims, ancl that the option, which commenced on
.Tnly J.), 19nB, expired on January l.'i, 1964, without having hceu exercised hy plaintiff. Amended Findings of
Fart and Conelnsio11s of Law dated Fehruary 21, 1967,
Hc<"onl, p. 92.

Paragraph 3 of the amended Findings of Fact of
r'rhrnary 21 reads:
:-L On July 25, 1963, Plaintiff and Defendants
sigm•tl a 10tter dated January 25, 1963, which ineorporated by reference a memorandum prepared
h_\· Alhert F. Lenhart and is dated July 11, 1963.
These two instruments constituted Plaintiff's Exliibit 2, which was admitted in evidence. There
\\·Pre also rertain oral understandings which supplPnH·11ted Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 and which con~i~te<l of thP following: (a) The option to lease re3

forre<l to iu Plaintiff\; Exhil>it 2 \ras to c·omrnu1ht
011 .July 13, 196:3 arnl expire 011 .January l:i, l~J()t
ff (b) Other provisions C'Ont<•mplated by the parties as a part of their trausaction would he snl>~e
quently negotiated and (c) FrNleriek H. Larson'.,
employment contract was to commence 011 Juh
13, 1963. The parties' actions and con<lud RuJ;_
sequent to the execution of Plaintiff's Exhibit~
were in accord with and confhmed the aforemr·it
tioued oral understandings. The 1iartics co11si1/_
ered the foregoi11g as creating au agrce1111'/1f /11._
tween them and acted accordingly. (Empha'i'
supplied)
Paragraph 3 of the Conclusious of La\r of Fehruan
21 real ls:
3. The option period expired 011 .Janna ry 1.i.
196±. Therefore, Plaintiff now has no right, title.
iuterest or claim iu nrnl to the Larson lands.
In short, the trial court concludccl that tlwrc wa~ i11
fact an euforceahle agret'ment, uot that it was fatally
deficient.
This Court appears to haw based
;\larch 7, 1968, in part upou the premise
found that the agreemeut of July 23,
agreement to agree" which was "not
forceable."

its deci,;ion or
that trial conrt
1963, was "an
specifically en-

This was indeed the purport of the vacated Fimlingi
of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared hy the defendants and erroneously entered by the trial court on Xo·
vember 1, 1966. These Yacated Findings and Conch1sio11>
recited in part :

4

:L Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, li;· itself or wh0n 1ornpplrmeut0il hy oral uml0rstnrnlings of the parties
as e1111mPrnte><l in Paragraph 3 of the Findings of
Fart 0ntered herein, c100s not constitute a complrtP agre0m0nt between the parties which can be
enforC'ecl or whirh the Court can order specifically
performP<l. At best, the Plaintiff's E~xhibit No. 2
cons tit ues only an expression of the parties' intent ion to ent0r into suhsequent formal agreem1•uts, which formal agreements were coutemplatt·d to include the agreed understandings provided
in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Since the parties by their
O\rn admissions left certain essential matters to
lie negotiated and subsequently included in formal agreements, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 constitutes
mily an ngre0ment to agree and as such is unenforcea hle.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial. At the heHring on
t Iii~ motioll the court informed the defendants that the
findings and conclusions entered on November 1, 1966,
.Ji,] not reflect the theory on which the case had been
d1·ridecl and entC'n·<l the Amended Findings of Fact and
('onclusious of Law of February 21, 1967. (Tr. 2, p 37-42)
It is obvious that this Court based its decision on
tl1e Yacated findings because this Court said in part:

.... the trial court found that the document,

hy its terms, which plaintiff asked the court to

construe, was not specifically enforceable. With
this conclusion we agree . . .
The uovel and complicated course of events in the
trial comt which resnlte>d in a record containing two sets
of romplPtely contradictory findings and conclusions appan•n11;· mislecl this Court.

This Court was further rni"k<l hy defendant's hrit{
On page 4 of defendant's briPf, lkfrndmits qnand witJ 1
plai11tiff 's statement of the case hoping to lead this conr:
to the belief that the trial court found the .July 2.j lcttei
was not enforeea hie.
The defendants' brief said in part :
C. On the bottom of Page 6 and at the top 0\
Page 7 of its Brief, Tosco states: 'Thereupon a
new letter agreement of July 25, 1963, 1chicl1 thl'
Trial Court found binding on both parties, \\'a.drafted in Larson's presence.' (Emphasis sup
plied.) This statement is 110t correct. A re\'iPw
of the initial Findings of Faet and Conclusions ui
Law entered by the Trial Court on Nm·ember 1,
1966 and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as revised and entered hy the Court on ,Jm1nary 6, 1967, will conclusively show that the .Tnh
Letter, in and by itself, was never considered a>
being binding upon the parties by the Trial Court,
or for that matter, by the parties themselws
( 1'r-1, Pg. 115 L 20-28; Tr-1, Pg. 78, Y 16-23.\
Brief of Respondents, Page 4.
This is followed by defendants' argument IA which
devotes eleven and one-half pages to an issue not beforr·
this Court - \Vhether the letter of .July 25, 1963 wa>
specifically enforceable. It is little wonder that thi~
Court was uncertain about what the trial court really
held. Where this Court has "misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or ... [has] either mistaken
or overlooked something that materially affects the result," a rehearing is in order. Cummings v. Nielso11, 42
Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619, 624 (1913), on petition for rehearing.
6

J'laintiff rE'srwctfully asks this Court upon rehearing
111 in rnkc• thr well-known rules of appellate procedure
,r!iich a re designed to prC'cl ude the capricious shifting of
posit ion which has caused so much confusion both in this
('on rt and in the trial court. These rules are set forth in
tli<' a 1 guments which follow.
B. Defendants are precluded from contesting
the trial court's finding that there was a
binding option contract because (1) def Mulants urged the trial court to make
such a finding and (2) defendants hat·e
not filed a cross-ap7Jeal asserting such
fi11di11,q as error.
(1) lm:ited Error

Prior to trial defendants amendE'd their answE'r to
alleg(• a completed option contract which had expired on
.Tiinuary 15, 1964:
The Defe11dants . . . admit that on July 25,
10():1, tl1r Dcfomlants granted to the Plaintiff a
six-month option relating to certain unpatented
and patented mining claims owned or controlled
h,,- th0 Defendants through Larson Oil Company.
The pPriod of the option granted by the Defendants nm from ,July 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964,
at whirh timE' said option expired . . . . (Defendant's Amended Answer, Paragraph I, Sub-paragTnpl1 2, RProl'Cl, p. 40.)
,\ft0r plni11tiff had moYed for a new trial, defendant~, i11 opposing plaintiff's motion, agnin urged thP
1na1 ('Ollrt to co11dn<l0 that tlwre was a hinding optio11
('r>ntrn('t. Tll(• following colloqu>- took placC' between th0
I ri<tl 1·11 111·\ n11d ~r r. ,fr11scn, mw of drfendn11ts' attorC'n~-s:

-I

Tim ( 'onff: I 1hi11k it is rather 1wculiar fo,
yon peopk• to comp i11 a11d argm• tlwre wns 110 op.
tiou whPn your client says tlwr0 was an op1io 11
and tC'stified according]~.,

.:\In . .JENSEN: \Vell, if tlw court please wlH'n J
am addressing mysplf to that, T'm looking at tJ,i.'
thing from the date of the docum0nts, a1Hl WP arf'
talking now, ahont spPcific performance.
THE CounT: If T cau 't rply upon the testimom
of your client.
·
it.

.\In . .JEN"SEX: Th0re is not

m1y

question aliou1

THE Cornn: 'I'h0n thPn' on.ght to he a
of my decision.

re1·iP\\

"
THE Coewr: ]:..; the court justifiNl from the cri.
deuce, rea<'hing the couclnsion that there was a11
option hetwPen the parties which hega11 011 .Jnl>
15th, and run to .January 15th'? If there wa'
such a noption, did the plaintiff comply with the
terms of it, exercise his option, if lH' did not, rLil
he have an extension of time'?
Now is the court justified in finding snch a11
option f
Mn . .JENSEN: ThP court is justifiPd i11 findin~
that the parties hoth operated on that propo:~i
tion.
THE Co·rnT: And the~· fail0c1 to Px0rcise their
option'?
?\In. .JENSEN : They failed to exercise witlii11
the period of time, and failed to exercise it at all
THE CounT: And the paying of the $20,~0()
was justified, because that was tlw <'Onsi<lrratio11
for the option?

8

\l i: .• h:.\"sEl": 'I'his is tnw.
T11E (

tliatt

'ot"HT: Thr court 1s justifie<l

111

finding

\Ii: . .JExsEx: Yes.

Tm: ( 'ol'HT: Drws tlH' finding that the court
mndP refle('t that condition"?
~1 n . .J EXSEN : ~Ir.

Jw <louhts if they do.

Ruland indicates to me that

THE CoFnT: Do you want to offer proposed
modifications of the Findings·~

\In.

HuLAXD:

\Ve crrtainly do.

:\In .•JE~sE&: \Ve certaillly do.
( 'l'r-2, pp. 41-44)
Tlwrenf11'J", dcfo11dants suhmitted and the trial court
1•11h•red amended fimlings and conclusions of Fehruary
~], 19GI, \\·hi('h found a hirnling contract between the
JIHrtir~.

011 tl1is appPal, the <lefrndants attacked the very find-

ings and ro11clusioJ1s which tlH'Y had prepared for the
lrinl court, asserting that the option contract, which is
t lw ha sis for those findi11gs, did not exist. Defendants'
Brief, pp. 8-19. Under the cloctrinr of "invited error,''
\\ hif'h this Court has consiste11tl~, followed, defendants
are preclude<1 from attacking on appeal the findings of
Liet nnrl c011rlusioJ1s of law which they asked the trial
1·onr1 to rntPr. Tn Pettingill Y. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266,
~li0, 212 P.2d 183 (1934) this Court stated:

H1wi11g by his own plradings, eYidence, and inst ruction tried and rested the case upon the
thror~· that the mother's llegligence would bar the

9

father, he is bound thereby, as the law of thr
case. He cannot now on appeal shift his thcon
and position.
·
See also Ludlull' \', Colorado A11imal By-I'ror/ 11 , f,
Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943); Eca11s v. 8ha11il,
74 Utah 451, 280 Pac. 239 (1929); Obradovich v. Walker
Bros. Bankers, 80 Utah 587, 16 P.2d 212 (19:32); All'arP:
Y. Paulus, 8 Utah 2d 283, 333 P.2d 633, 635 (1939); M.01 111
v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 P.2d 603, 605 (19fil):
Rohmfalk v. Vaughan, 89 Ariz. 33, 357 P.2d 617, G21

(1960); 5 Am. Jur 2d "Appeal and ~rror," F16, pp.
Hil-2. The general rule is stated in 5 C.J.S. "Ap1wal nnd
Error," ~1503:
The general rule is that a person cannot fry
his rasp on onp theory in the trial court and 011
another theory in a court of r0vie"'· \Vhether thr
result in the trial court is in his fayor or against
him and this is the rule both in hrw aml equity .
. . . henee a party is estoppNl to urge on appeal or
error any error growing out of the trial submi:;sion or f1ccision of the cause or of any questi011
therein upon an incorrect theory 1che11 such theory

of his ow11 selPcfion or 1rlie11 such theory was
adozJtPrl by the trial court at his req11Psf.

1rns

\Vhen a party relies in the trial court 011 acertain ground or theo1T of action or <ldcnse he j,
hound thereby and will not be allowed in the appellate court 'to assume or adopt any position or
attitrnlC' which is inconsistent therewith or to
shift, ehang·C' or aharnlo11 his theory or conteutiom
nor will lw lw ]1pard to qu<'sti011 th<> proprict~- or
thc> nlli<lih· of l1is cotll'"C' i11 that hf•half nor may
lit• c•1ilan1.!.(~· hi" tlll'on· of n•c·m·pr~-. Tlir rnlC' ap-

10

plirs to a party who has tried his case wholly or
in part on a certain theory. (Emphasis supplied)
'I'he def Pndants asked the trial court to find a bindiug option contract between the parties. They cannot on
1l1i~ ;ipp«al

attack that finding.

(2) Failure to Cross Appeal

The Llefcndants <lid not cross-appeal from the
.\mended .J udgmeut of the trial court. A respondent
11lio has !lot eross-appealed is precluded from attacking
tlw judgment of the lower court. This rule was stated
by the U. S. Supreme C'onrt in LeTulle v. Schofiield, 308
r.s . ..J-15, t!O S. Ct. 313 (Hl40) at p. 316:
A respondent or an appellee may urge any
matter appearing in the record in support of a
judgment, but he may not attack it even on
grounds asserted in the court below, in an effort
to hav<> this Court reverse it when he himself has
110t sought review of the whole judgment, or of
that portion which is ach·erse to him. (Emphasis
supplied)

C. The trial rourt found, and was correct in
fi11di11g, a binding option contract.
(1) The agreement of .July 25, 1963, although intended to be a preliminary
agreement, was a complete and fully
integrated writing which, when acted
upon by the parties, became am enforceable agreement.

The letter of July 25, 1963, was the rc>sult of extendi•d, prr!imi11ary negotiations which began in May, 1963.
11

It was iuten<lPd to, and <hd, i11corporatu nil of thP mati·
rial pro,·isio11s nePded for the parties' attorney;.; to draft
the> drtailed formal do<'uments which \\·Pre to follow. lt.,
terms are rn·rcise all([ dc>finitP. They define: (a) tl1e parties ; ( h) the lands c·onn•d ; ( e) the option priC'e; ( d) t\ 11 .
consideration to be paid 011 exercise of the option; (c·)
the delay rentals; (f) the royaltic•;.; to llC' pai<l i111hP 1·1p111
of reduction; (g) tlw purchase price in the e\·ent the pm
chase option is Pxercisecl; and (h) the procedures to li1·
followc><l in ohtai11ing patents on the claims. It \Yill' d1•
signed to guicle lawyers and othern in the lll'Pparation ol
formal agreements. And it did in fact serYe this purpose. Larson admitted that he :rnd his lawyer had hP1•11
ahle to prepare drafts complete in eYery clf'tail. ][j,
testimony rea<.ls:

A. \\"" e had the .Jul~· 2;) lc>tt0r th0y werr goiuv
on. l\fr. Dufford presenh>cl the completed leasr·
with descriptions completrd in ew'ry cletail, rarly
in Dect>mlwr. There \\'Olllcl haYe he0n 11lenty or
time.

Q. But actuall~- what was happening, yon wm·
ha Ying exchange of agTerments, uncompleted exchange of agreements hetween two lawyers who
were attempting to finalize what you agreed on:
~\. That is not correet. These 1u'rr:

a9rce111ents.
41, 42)

(Emphasis

supplied.)

comp/etnl
(Tr-1, PP

At a11other point Larson trstified that he ha(l threateue1l
suit on this rery contract. ('fr-1, p. EIS) Larson's at·
torney also recognized that there were no material omi's10ns. He dc>scrilws the 011/y two areas of (liffereure hrtweeu his (lrnfts of Decc'mher 13 nrnl the .Jnl» 2:i, 1%:l
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I,\ lc'r.

a11<l <·011cludes that as to the;;e an•as of diffrrence

tlir tPrms of the ldter of .July ~.") "·ould he eontrolling.

11 l'

,;a id:

\\'Ji~· C'ould they not lHwe said to Larson, as
tlwy testified in the trial, 'Your drafts are just
about substantially it, :·ou've got two things, one
you said to do the patenting at our expense, and
iliat is not what the letter says. 'l'his is clear, we
know, \\·e decided that the patenting is going to
he do11e liy us with your assistance at our expense.

,,.<'

\Ye \·e got to change that around, because that
agree<l on, that is in the letter.'

ThP second point. The Larson draft left an
omission as to ,diat the amount of the purchase
price <Jf tlw daims was to he, and the method of
its payme11t, in the eYent that TOSCO elected
sometime in the future to huy the property under
tlw lease option. But, that \\·as also covered in
the letter. TOSC'O could haYe said, 'Look, there
1s a formula in the letter.'
The·:· eould liaw said at that point,' Your draft
is fiJ1c, 11·r hff1·r clia11gcd tliose t1co things, and ice
are ready to 1·.rcrnte.' That ll'OUld hal'e created a
re11l hi111li11g question lierr, there is no question
11ho11f tliat at that pnhd, Larso11 ll'OUld hare had
to say, "All right I a111 ready.' He said in his
111('/llO wlie11 lie transfrrred tlie drafts, 'nr e are
fl'ady to siqn.' (Emphasis supplied.) (Tr-3, pp.
46, 47)

lt i~ clenr that wheu Larson was pressing for money, he
ilitl 11ot n•ganl the ldter of .Jnly 25, 1963, or the drafts
that had been pr;,;pared pursuant to such agreement as
ddieie11t in makrial terms.
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There is no question but that a preliminary agrpe
m0nt, 0\'en though contPmplating the C>xccution of m1 1r 1
formal documents, may be or become binding upon tJi 1.
parties thereto even though the more formal docume 11 t~
arc newr prepared. Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164
P.2d 893 (1946). See also, Cummings v. Niclso11, 42 FM
157, 129 Pac. 619 (1913) reh. drn.; NielsoJ1 v. Rucker,~
Utah 2d 802, 3:i:i P.2cl 1067 (1959); Emrrma11 \', Balr/11111,
186 Pa. Super. 561, 142 A.2(1 440 (1958); Smith v. 011111
Oil & Chemical Co., 218 F.8d 104 (3rd Cir. 1955); 1 \Yil
liston, Contracts (2cl ed. 1936), §§28, 28A; RPstatrme111,
Contracts, §26. v\"11ere the parties el0ct to proceed i11
accordance with tlw t0rms of a preliminary agreemPnt
withont ex0cution of further contemplated \Hitings, thP)
"·ill become bound to the terms contai11ed in the preliminary agT0ement. See, Cal11111Pf R!'fini119 Co. v. Star L1
bri1·afi11q Co., (i4 Ptah 358, 230 Pac. 1028 (1924); Bradle·1
v. Jfefropolita11 Jf11sic Co., 89 Minn. 516, % N.W . .J,,}
(1903); American Arro Cor1Jornfio11 v. Gra11d ('f'11fra/
A ircraff Co., 1;;5 Cal. A pp. 2d 69, 31'i P.2(1 694 (195i):
Corhin, Co11fra.cts, ~101; 29 Am.Jm.2(1, Crmfracfs, ~~R.

p. :-366.
Larson ask0d for pn~·ment, implicit!)· waiving execution of fi11al docum011ts. TOSCO complif·d with thi,
request and paid the $20,000 c1u0 on commenccmr11t of
the option. This conduct demonstrates that neither pai1:
c011siderec1 the final execution of formal docume11b ii'
a conditio11 pr0ced011t to performallre. RatlH•r they elect
c•(l to proceed, co11fidellt of tlie turms in thP prelimi11an
agTPPmen t.
14

(2) The omissions ichich have been cited by
the Court as fatal are in fact either not
supported by the euidence or legally immaterial.

This Court found three areas in which the agreeme11t of July 25, HJ6:3, was deficient: (a) it lacked pro1 i,;ions stating when the lease would begin or end; (b)
1t (li.d uot state what type of conveyance would be used if
tlH· option to purrhase were exercised; ( c) there was no
11ru\ ision which estahlished the exact date when the six1
mouth option to lease would commence; and ( d) this
l'omt also found that one of the provisions of the agreemmt might offensive to the rule against perpetuities.
(a) The option contract does not lack provisions
:.;o,·erning the commencement or termination of the lease.
l'laintiff respectfully disagrees that the agreement of
Jnl~· 25, 196:3, does not provide when any lease to be
acquired thereu11der would commence to run. It is pro1·illed that the lease would commence during the sixmo11th option period at the time of the exercise of the
optioll.

Suhparagraph 2 of the agreement of July 23, 196:3,
11ro1·irlt>s:

By the end of the six month period, TOSCO
11111st elect 1chether to lease the lands for oil shale
mining ... If it elects to lease, it will at the time
of the election deliver to Fred B. Larson and Ethe>] B. Larson, his wife, 2,500 shares of its authorized hut unissued common stock and simultaneously deliver to Frederick H. Larson and Dorothy
H. Larson, his wife, 2,500 shares of its authorized
but unissued common stock, . . . (Emphasis supplied)
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In this respect this transaction do<'s 11ot differ from
other options to lease. Si1we the optio11 to lensL• mu~t Ii,
exercised cl uring the term of t h0 opt ion and t li0 con~i,]
eration for the leasr must he deliver0cl at the timf' of
the exercise of the opio11, it must he }ll'PsnmPd that, nu
less otherwise s1weified, the lease \\·oul(l eomm<'llC'P tql( 111
the exereiS(' of the option.

It is true that the agreement of Jul~· 2.), 19G.i, dol'.,
not specifieally proYidP for the termination of the lea~('.
Ho\\·e,·er, thP absence of a specified termination date i11
a mining lease is not fatal. D. A. C. ['ra11i11111 Co. v. R1·11
to 11, 149 F.Supp. 6G7. In fact, the so-called "no term"
lease has ht•comL' eommon. See, 3 A 111crica11 Law of Jfo_
i119, 0641: 2 811111111ers. Oil and Gas (Pf'l'm.Ed.), ~280.
In the mineral law field, thL' lease for an i11defi11ilt·
period is well recog11ized and is usually constrnCLl as n
grant or a sale of the minerals in place, 3 A111rrica11 La11
of Mi11i11g, ~1616, the mining lessee being Yested with a
conditiomtl or cldPrmiuable fee. S111ith '°· Alrlrn Coal Cu.,
3-1-7 Pa. 290, 32 A.2d 227 (1943).

If a lease pro,·idcs for a demise of a certain
Yein, bed or lode within certain limits all(] contains no limitations as to time it is limited onl:
hY the exhaustion of the minPral. 58 C.J.S. Jlines
a;ul ll1i11crals, ~171, 2 Snyder on l\fows, \12011
(1902).
Thus, alihough the option contract does not prorick
for a spPcific (lay certain upo11 \\°l1irh the lease is to hr-
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11r
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,,['

l1•nui11ate, the cYents whieh deh>rmine thP 1luratht> lPas<' arP clearly asrertainahlP.

!h) Tlw failure of the July 25, 1963 agreement to

, 1weify thr tn>e of document of ronveyance whirh was
!fl

iir' rrnplo)·cd if plaintiff exercised its option is legally

imnnterial.

It is uniYersally rerog-nized that the law will

'liJlJll)· tl1e form of C'OJffeyance where the parties are

,j]1•11t. T,urklear '°· Tucker, 69 Idaho 84, 203 P.2d 380,
:;s+ (10-!0); A('corrl, Hoth v. Kahler, 74 N.W. 2d 440,
+~>1-2 (;\.D. rn;:JG).

\Vhile the courts differ as to the type

11f d1•<. d wltirh will be required, we have found no case
1

i11 whieh a conrt h<.•ld a rontrart of sale or an option defL1din· l>ecansc the form of document was not specified

the parties. See, e.g., T7itra Seal Co. v. Jaycox, 1 N.J.
:-:11per. :i60, G2 A.2<1 431 (Ch. Di\-. 1948) (bargain and
·ah· tlccd ,,·ithont con•nants; Obre!J v. ('ollins, 121 ".\Iisc.
l:P11. '.rl, :200 N.Y.~. 175, 176 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (a deed
,. 11ir·h 1rill conyey a good title, free and rlear of en1·mnhrm1r<.•); Dr:1ce!J Y. Hines, 81 Kan. 834, 126 Pac. 1093
rJ~l1:2 pn rl!l'iam) (<1Ped with the usual connants of
1rnrra11t)·); T,rJn'Joy Y. ('011lo111be, 152 ".\fe. 385, 131 A.2d
+.iO. +.i/ (19;)/) (rJnit claim <Iced with special connants
11 f 11:nrant)· against enrnmhranres created by the grant()J'-;); Jfasfer Laboratories v. Ches1111t, 154 Neb. 749, 49
\'.\\'. 2rl 603 (1951) ( <1eed sufficient to convey marketahl(' tit It•; R11ildinq !11r711strics, Ille. "· Tr right Prorlucts,
l11r., 240 :\li1111. -173, 6~ N.W. ~cl 208 (19:>3) (\rnrranty
d1·0rl); Petrie\". Slo1l"i11ski, 231 Wis. 478, 29 N.W. 2d 505
1
'I.fl) ( :-;tntntor)' form of warranty deed); 92 C.J.S.
I'rurlur & Purchaser, ~235, pp. 107-108; 55 Am.Jur.
!1~·
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Vend or and Purchaser, §§313-315, pp. 745-7 48; III A mrr

ican Laic of Property, §ll.56(b), pp. llG-6.

Where the law will supply a term in a contract, th 1
contract will not be deficient for failure of the partiP,
to supply the term. Lockyear Y. Tucker, supra; cf. C11111 _
mings Y. Nielsen, supra, 129 P.2d at 622. Because th1'
law will supply the form of co1iY0yance to he userl if
plaintiff exercises its option, the parties should be ell
titled to rely upon that which the law will pro'.'id0.
Before any lessee who also holds on option to pnr
chase leased lands decid0s to exercise its option, it will
han satisfied itself as to tlw d<>sirahility of the proposed
purchase, which would at tlw nry least include satisfaetion with title to the lands in question. This being th
case, it is immaterial whether the title co1iYeyed is bi\Ynrranty or quit claim deed. In either case, its primar)
relianc0e would lw on its o\n1 i1iYestigation.

It is a common practicl' i11 the mining industry to
convey patented claims by warranty de0d and unpatentrcl
claims hy special \Yananty dred ,d1ich warrants 01111
against those pen;ons claiming h~', through or under
grantor. This practice was follO\Yecl hy defendant' i1!
their drafts of December 13, 1963.
( c) The agrermrnt of July 23, 1963, is clear as !1 1
when the option is to brgiu. Plaintiff respectfully assert,
that, although the agreemrnt of .July 23, 1963, does no\
sp<>cify 011 e:ract date when tlw option commences, it i;
nnamhiguous in pro\·idiug \Yhen, in relation to other
18

,;ds, the option was to begin.

Paragraph 1 provides:

1. TOSCO will pay $20,000 at the time of
signing of the agreements ($10,000 to Fred V.
and Ethel B. Larson, his wife; and 10,000 to Fredl'rick H. Larson and Dorothy H. Larson, his
wife), and will receive in turn a six months' option during which ...

The commencement date of the option became exact
"·lil'n, on January 31, 1964, plaintiff at defendants' urgi11g-, paid $10,000 to Fred V. and Ethel B. Larson, his
wife, and $10,000 to Frederick H. Larson and Dorothy H.
Lan;on, his wife. TOSCO was as of that date entitled to
"rcc,·iw• in turn a six-month option. n The fact that the
partieH did not insist at that time on signing the agreeme11t does not alter the fact that the defendants asked for
and receiw•d the bargained for consideration to be paid
at the commencement of the option. Thereupon, defend·:nts \\·ere obligated to perform.
(rl) The provisions of the agreement of July 25,

do not violate the rule against perpetuities. Althong-h this Court has not been explicit in stating which
term violates the rnle agaiust perpetuities, such objection must he aimed at either the indefinite term of the
1
l·a~e or the provisions granting to lessee an option to
pnrchai;e during its term. The grant of a mineral lease
for an indefinite term has universally been held not to
"iolate> the rule against perpetuities. Smith v. Aggregate
S11µply Cu., 214 Ga. 20, 102 S.E. 2d 539 (1958); 4 Ameri11u1 La1c nf Mi11i11g, ~16.42.
l~JG:i,
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In the United States, an optiou to pnrcl1ns(• i11 ,,
lease exercisable during the tenant's term is Yalid ri·
gardll'ss of the length of thC' lPasP. (i A111erica11 /,01 1 ,, 1
Property, ~24.::i/; 4 RPstnt<>mP11t, Prop<>rt>· (1~J44), '.;:9.1

( 3) E 1·e11 if the ag rcem e11 t of J ,,/ !J 2:i, rnr1:1,
i11 its origi11al form 111i_qltf be heir/ lo /1,

deficient in material frrms, those fr1111.•
hul'e bee11 s11p11lied by the drafts 11rrpari1/
by crmnscl for defe11da11ts as co11te111pluteil
by the a,qrceme11t .

E,·pn if this Court concludes that the ngTPenwnt

11[

July 25, 1963, is vague and m1certai11 as to certaiu 1enn,_
thPrf' can he no (pwstion as to thC' partiPs' int<>qn·datio11
of those tl•rms. The comments of Defendant Lnrso11 awl
his connsPl, Dufford, cited on pages 12 and 1~. supru,
refute any contention hy the clefemlants that thP parti1"
ha(l failed to agree 011 essential tC'rms. 'l'l1e>· harl 1111
problem in preparing their drafts hC'canse of yai;ur111"''
or u11certainty. These drafts, llatell Decemlwr 1:1, 106::.
which were prepared without furtlH•r consultation \l'ith
plaintiff or its age11ts, represent def0nclants' ow11 intvrpretation of the terms in questio11. 'l'hese e011stnwtio11.hy the parties themseh-es are C'utitlecl to grPat, if 11111
coutrolling, influ0nce. .l<'nki11s Y. Je11sc11, :2--1- Utnli JOS.
GG Pac. 773, 779 (1901); C11111111iJ1qs Y. J/irlstafes (!ii
Corp., 103 :!\Iiss. 678, 9 Ro. 2cl 648 (1942); Earp. Y. Jfi 11
Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 27 P.2d 8:i:i.
864-866 (1933); 17 Am ..Jnr., (2/4. The trial court fo1111il
that the parties consiclPrC'd themseh·es i11 agreement a11il
acted accordingly. (Record, p. 92)
20

Jl.

THIS < 0l1RT IL\S NOT DECIDED THE
SOLE QUESTION ON APPEAL WHICH
JS "WHETHER AN UXA~IBIGUOUS OPT10N CONTRACT C"\N BE VARIED BY
P"\ROL EVIDENCE.
1

This ('on rt has uot deeiclecl the question raised by
11 11 . 1ri;d1·1nll't 's

amended jmlgmellt and plaintiff's appeal

1J 11 .1cfn>m. That question is the basis of this appeal and
1l1e ollly one ,,·hich this Court ean properly eonsider. See,
,) .\m ..Tm.~f1 AJJJJeal a11rl Error, ·s~723-725, pp. 116-169.
Sincl' tlefell<lants cannot properly object, this Court
,J1ould affirm the final judgment of the trial court insofar
11, it fon1111 that the parties had entered into a hinding
· 11p1 ion ront ract. This Court can then focus upon the central que:;tion upon whif'h this case was tried and ap111·:1bl: Could the parties hy oral agreements vary the
1"qm·ss provisions of the .J nly 25 agreement to provide

'"·1

th(' t·omm011cemcnt of the six-month option period
13, 1963 ~This question is disposed of in favor of
plaintiff hy the parol edclence rnle, thC' doctrine of mer-

1.i1.Ju!~-

and the statute of frauds heretofore exhaustively
hi1·frd hy lioth plaintiff ancl llefC'nclants in this appeal.
Se!' Appellm1t's Brief, pp. 30-37, .\ppellant's Reply
Brief, pp. HJ, 20.
'i'l'l'

UT. SU.'.\E\JARY.
'!'his ( 1 ourt erred in hasing its decision 011 findings
111111 rnuclnsions ·which lrn(l been vocated hy the trial court
di<1 so 011 the nrgi11g of defendants. Since defendants
Ii;-· plenr1i11gs, evidence and findings and conclusions have
:idr 1ptl>d !lie position that there is a valid binding option
(· 11 11trnc-t, th0y are vreclnded from denying the hinding

:111d

21

nature of that option cont rad in this Court h,,. the do(•.
trim' of "invited error" and hecaus(' the~· failPd to ero%.
appeal from the trial court's jmlgml'nt in whole or in
part.
The trial court was coned in firn1iug that ti1Pre 1rai
a binding option c011traet, a position "·hich dc.fc'JHiant
cannot here contest.
The sole question rema1111ng for decision herr is
whether the unambiguous agrePmr>nt of .J nly 2:i, 19G3.
can he Yaried h>- parol e\·idPnce, a question m1s11·rred by
the doctrine of mC'rgC'r, thl' parol eYi(lence rule and the
Statute of Frauds.
For the foregoing reasons we rcs1wctfully reque~t
the Court to grant a rehearing in this ease and rero11sider
its deeisio11. \Ye rpquPst that thr judgnwnt .of the Distriet Court he affirmed insofar as it hPld that there was
a hirnli11g option agrcempnt hPh\'l'ell the partiPs mid the
judgment he rrYerscd imwfar as it hPld that the option
period Pxpired. \Ve rPquest that jmlgment ]Jc cutt>red
for tlie plaintiff granting it a six-month option to lease
in accordance "·ith Exhibits "A" and "B '' to Appellant's Brief on appeal or, that the mntter he remanded
to tlw District C(Jurt for a uew trial.
Respectfnll>· submitted,
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Salt Lake Cit>·, Utnh
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